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Article 2

LAW INCARNATE*

Mark Johnson'
It is only in the last decade or so that there has been
significant work on cognitive science and law. Before that,
there was no such field as the "cognitive science of law." The
reason for this is quite simple. First-generation cognitive
science had nothing interesting to say about law because it was
based on erroneous assumptions about mind, thought, and
language. First-generation cognitive science, which emerged in
the 1960s, grew out of work in computer science and artificial
intelligence that assumed that the mind was disembodied and
that thought could be modeled as a functional computational
program. This view of cognitive science, which still remains
quite influential today, drew on views of thought and meaning
that were prevalent in information processing psychology,
analytic philosophy, and generative linguistics. Nothing in this
paradigm either challenges or contributes to methods and
analyses that are available in traditional legal theory.
Consequently, that brand of cognitive science simply does not
have much to offer to the study of law (nor, I might add, to the
study of the mind).'

©2002Mark Johnson. All Rights Reserved.
t Mark Johnson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oregon. He is
co-author, with George Lakoff, of Metaphors We Live By (1980) and Philosophy in the
Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (1999), and he is
author of The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and
Reason (1987) and Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics
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1 Excellent accounts of the nature of, and problems with, first-generation
cognitive science are given in TERRY WINOGRAD & FERNANDO FLORES,
UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS AND COGNITION: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR DESIGN (1986)
and FRANCISCO VARELA ET AL., THE EMBODIED MIND: COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND HUMAN
EXPERIENCE (1991).
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Another reason why there is so little good work to date
on cognitive science and law is that it is so difficult to acquire
the requisite interdisciplinary background in all of the relevant
fields of study. Only a handful of people have been able to
master the cognitive science research and also know enough
about the law and legal theory to draw out the relevant
implications Indeed, even within cognitive science, very few
have the interest and breadth of learning to gain an
appropriate
knowledge
of linguistics,
developmental
psychology, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience,
and I suspect that none of the people in this small group has
any substantial knowledge of law. To make matters even
worse, an equally small number of people trained in the law
have even a superficial knowledge of what is going on in the
vast and ever-expanding fields of cognitive science today.
Happily, things have changed dramatically over the last
decade. The reason for this transformation is the emergence of
a second generation of cognitive science that challenged, on
empirical grounds, many of the fundamental assumptions of
first-generation cognitive science.3 This new approach produced
a growing body of empirical evidence that required a new view
of mind, thought, and language as both embodied and
imaginative. Instead of seeing the mind as disembodied, the
evidence revealed that our conceptualization and reasoning are
grounded in our bodily experience, shaped by patterns of
perception and action. Instead of seeing thought as
algorithmic, the evidence revealed that thought is at once
constrained by the logic of our bodily experience and at the
same time dependent on various structures of imagination.
These imaginative processes are shaped by the nature of our
bodies, our brains, and the patterns of our interactions with
our environment. Imagination is therefore constrained and
orderly, rather than unruly and irrational.
of the analysis of conceptual metaphor in legal reasoning include
Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenant, Property
and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 305, 353-64 (1999); F. Stephen Knippenberg,
FutureNonadvance Obligations:PreferencesLost in Metaphor, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1537
(1994).
3 The assumptions and results of second-generation cognitive science
are
summarized in GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE
EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 3-117 (1999).
2Examples
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If you apply these new results of contemporary cognitive
science to questions about the nature of legal reasoning, you
get stunning results. That is precisely what Steven Winter has
done in A Clearingin the Forest.! With an unparalleled breadth
and depth, he explores the way recent empirical research from
the sciences of mind gives us a new understanding of legal
reasoning as embodied, situated, and imaginative. Winter's
most impressive achievement is the way he shows how
embodied organisms like us, interacting continually with our
physical, social, and cultural environments, come up with laws
and legal institutions that are at once constrained by our
embodiment and at the same time are imaginative, creative,
and flexible in their application to our ever-changing
experience.
What distinguishes Winter's work is that it exhibits a
depth of understanding of cognitive science that is nearly equal
to the depth and breadth of his understanding of, and
experience with, the practice of law and legal theory. This
places Winter in a small and highly elite group of legal scholars
who understand, in a profound and detailed way, why cognitive
science today requires us to rethink some of our most cherished
ideas about law. Winter's project is to develop a genuinely
productive dialogue between cognitive research (including
cognitive neuroscience), the work of philosophers ranging from
J.L. Austin to Merleau-Ponty to Heidegger to Foucault, and the
mountains of legal theory (and practice) that have arisen over
the past hundred years.
The application of cognitive science to law rests on the
following assumption: Law is a human creation of human
minds dwelling in human bodies, in human societies, operating
within human cultural practices. And so, to understand how
law works, one must know how all these aspects of human
experience and thought work. To oversimplify, we have got to
know how the "mind" works, and that is precisely the focus of
the cognitive sciences. Hence, the cognitive sciences are
indispensable for a comprehensive and deep understanding of
law.

4 STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND
MIND
(2001).
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Now, one is entitled to know why any of this should
matter. My answer is this: It humanizes law. It makes legal
reasoning comprehensible by explaining it as the result of basic
human capacities for meaning-making and for deliberation and
judgment. The picture that emerges from these analyses is that
legal concepts are, for the most part, not static, literal, contextfree principles, and yet neither are they arbitrary or radically
subjective social constructions. Winter traces a middle way
between the extremes of objectivism and subjectivism. We do
not simply "discover" legal concepts and apply them to cases;
nor do we construct them out of thin air, driven only by our
interests and our pursuit of power. Instead, they grow out of
our problematic, historically and culturally situated communal
practices and institutions. They are at once constrained by
communally embedded understandings and practices, and yet
they are open-ended in important ways that make it possible
for law to grow in response to significant changes in human
history. As Winter so eloquently expresses this, "what actually
stands behind the majestic curtain of Law's rationality and
impartiality is nothing other than ourselves and our own, often
unruly social practices."5 And the cognitive sciences have much
to teach us about ourselves, our social practices, and law.
When I say that Winter's work "humanizes" law, what I
mean is that, by showing how law is the result of ordinary
human processes of conceptualization and reasoning (many of
which are unconscious), we discover both why law is so
important for us (why it can work the way it does) and also
what its limitations are. One of the most important lessons we
can learn from this work is how dangerous legal
fundamentalism is. By "fundamentalism" I mean the view that
all meaning is specifiable in sets of literal concepts and
propositions that can apply directly to our given experience,
and that reasoning is a rule-like activity that operates logically
and linearly with these concepts. In our culture,
fundamentalism is understood to be a religious and theological
doctrine about the nature of religious belief and revealed truth.
But it is, in fact, a literalism and objectivism about knowledge

5Id. at xiv.
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and understanding that extends to all aspects of our lives, from
religion to morality to law to politics to science to art.
It is important to see that the fundamentalism (which
Winter calls the "rationalist" or "objectivist" model) is not
limited only to traditional foundationalist accounts of meaning
and knowledge. He shows why many so-called "postmodern"
views of concepts, reasoning, and law are equally
fundamentalist in their own way. Here there are two main
versions of postmodern fundamentalism: First, there are those
who assume that, if there are no absolute foundations, then our
only alternative is subjectivism and relativism, which they
complacently embrace. They thus buy into objectivism's
either/or view of knowledge and meaning. They implicitly
accept the fundamentalist idea that the only knowledge there
is must be based on absolute literal foundations. Second, there
are liberal Wittgensteinians who pride themselves on having
understood that all our thought is framed by language games,
but who then naively proceed to analyze aspects of various
language games using objectivist tools and assumptions. Their
very method of analysis is based on fundamentalist views of
thought and language, and so this stains their insights about
the context-dependence of our conceptual systems and
practices. In short, the fundamentalism that Winter carefully
dismantles and replaces with a cognitively realistic orientation,
is a pervasive objectivism that can be found throughout many
of our most popular views of meaning, thought, and language.
In some of my earlier work,7 I focused my criticism
mostly on the ethical version of fundamentalism, which I
named the Moral Law Folk Theory. According to the Moral
Law Folk Theory of ethics, morality is a system of universal
rules, ascertainable by human reason, and supposedly
supplying strict guidance for ethically correct action Reason,
according to this objectivist view, guides the will by giving it
moral laws-laws that specify which acts are morally
6 Analyses and criticisms of the objectivist views of meaning, reason, and
,truth that underlie such fundamentalism can be found in MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY
IN THE MIND at xix-xxxviii, 1-17, 173-212 (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND
DANGEROUS THINGS 157-218 (1987).
7 See generally MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION: IMPLICATIONS OF
COGNITIVE
8 SCIENCE FOR ETHICS (1993).
Id. at 1-12.
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prohibited, which are morally required, and which are simply
permissible. Universal reason not only is the source of all
moral laws but also tells us how to apply those principles to
concrete situations. Moral reasoning, based on this view, is
thus principally a matter of getting the correct description of a
situation, determining which moral law pertains to it, and
figuring out what action moral law requires for the given
situation. The corresponding fundamentalist version of this in
legal theory is, I assume, fairly obvious.
One of the important things Winter has done is to show
why such a fundamentalism is both psychologically unrealistic
and also dangerous. The massive evidence for its psychological
unreality comes mostly from studies of category formation,
conceptual structure, and reasoning. The fundamentalist view
requires what is known as the classical theory of categories,
according to which a given concept is defined by a precise set of
necessary and sufficient conditions, that is, a set of properties
or features that jointly define membership in a particular
category. Concepts of this classical sort are thought by
objectivists to provide the basis for moral and legal rules that
can be applied to concrete situations. As Winter explains:
All of the perceived advantages of rules derive from their categorical
quality. The clarity, certainty, and predictability for which rules are
prized are (on this view) a function of the conclusive and
unconditional nature of their coverage: If the posted speed limit is
fifty-five, then one may drive at fifty-five miles per hour. So, too, it is
the absolute character of a rule-i.e., its status as a categorical
reason for decision-that enables a decisionmaker to absolve herself
of responsibility by pointing to the rule as complete justification.9

Winter then proceeds to show that rules do not work this way,
partly because the concepts that make up the rules do not work
the way they are required to, and partly because rules only
work relative to a context of social and cultural practices,
institutions, and cognitive models.' °

'WINTER, supra note 4, at 187.
"Id. at 186-222.
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The philosopher John Searle has given some nice
examples of the situatedness of meaning that Winter is
arguing for." Now Searle is an objectivist and a literalist, so
his analysis of the cases he discusses is misguided, I believe.
But his humorous examples can be appropriated in support of
Winter's account. What Searle gets right is that the truth of
even the most straightforward propositions and directives rests
on a vast background of models, practices, and assumptions
that make it possible for us to understand and evaluate those
statements. Consider his example of the old philosophical
chestnut, "The cat is on the mat," used by countless
generations of unimaginative philosophers as an illustration of
literal meaning and truth conditions. "The cat is on the mat" is
true, if and only if the cat is on the mat.2 What could be more
obvious? However, as Searle points out, there is really nothing
obvious about this at all, for, in fact, our seemingly facile
determination of when the statement "The cat is on the mat" is
true depends on a large set of background assumptions. 3
Consider a simple picture we could draw of my cat,
Beta, sleeping happily on a woven mat. Here, it is
uncontroversially true that the cat is on the mat. But what
would the case be, for example, if the cat and mat had the same
orientation as in the picture of Beta and the mat, yet with cat
and mat floating in outer space beyond the Milky Way galaxy?
Oh, you will say, everybody knows that we meant that
the truth conditions apply only within our gravitational field,
at or near the earth's surface. So that would be like saying that
we render the sentence as "The cat is on the mat (this sentence
only applies at or near the surface of the earth or in some
similar gravitational field)." The idea here is that we would
just have to build in the relevant contextual conditions as part
of a background presupposed any time we make truth claims.
This is the view held by many who think that legal rules and
their concepts are completely determinate. They think that
what we're really doing in applying a law is just "making
" John Searle, Literal Meaning, in EXPRESSION AND MEANING:

STUDIES IN THE

THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 117-36 (1979).
12 One

can almost hear the nefarious Dr. Evil, of Austin Powers' fame,

expostulating "Cat... mat..., Cat on mat, riiiiiight." AUSTIN POWERS (New Line
Cinema 1997)
"Searle, supra note 11, at 120.26.
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explicit" what was "implicit" in the concept all along. But this

won't do, even for the cat on mat scenario. Searle asks, what if
we are in a rocket ship in outer space and we see cattmat pairs
floating by in various orientations. 4 Some float by in the
canonical cat on top of mat orientation, while others have the
mat turned vertically, but with the cat touching the mat. It
might be correct to affirm that the cat is on the mat in certain
orientations (including some non-canonical ones), even though
we are outside the gravitational field near the earth. But this
would be a matter of what our purposes and interests were in
stating truths about cats and mats. We cannot eliminate the
pragmatic concerns and interests of the people to whom such
utterances make sense and who use such utterances to
accomplish certain coordinated communicative ends.
You can see the same point, Searle argues, in
considering not just true or false descriptive assertions, but
also "performative" speech acts like directives and orders.
What if I order a hamburger, and you deliver it to me at the
restaurant encased in a two pound block of clear lucite plastic.
Did I fulfill your order, or not? Should you have said to me,
"hamburger with tomato and mayo, and hold the lucite." No,
you shouldn't have to say that, you don't have to say that, and
there is a good reason why. Ordering a hamburger is an act
performed within what Schank and Abelson call a restaurant
script.5 Members of a certain culture share idealized cognitive
models and frameworks or scripts concerning what typically
happens in restaurants. There are various agents (customers,
waiters, cooks, bus boys, cashiers), various objects (food,
silverware, dishes, tables, chairs, money), and various typical
action sequences (entering the restaurant, being seated,
ordering, being served, paying the bill, leaving). These scripted
activities and conceptual models vary depending on type of
restaurant, time of day, socio-economic class, etc. Some
restaurants have plastic "silverware," some have the cashier
identical with one of the waiters, some have no waiters at all
(as in fast food restaurants). We have highly articulated
cognitive models of what it means to order specific foods.
14
16

Id. at 121.
ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON,

AND UNDERSTANDING ch. 3, 42-61 (1977).

SCRIPTS, PLANS,

GOALS,
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Such examples are not just silly nitpickings or
and
mind-teasers. Behind their humor
entertaining
entertainment value lies an important point, even if Searle
mis-analyzes those cases and does not fully appreciate their
significance and scope. The important point is that any
statements we make, any directives we give, any rules we lay
down are applicable, not because the concepts specify their own
determinate conditions of satisfaction, but rather because we
understand these concepts and rules relative to shared
idealized cognitive models, scripts, and narratives that are tied
to embodied experiences, communal histories, practices, and
values. The rules can work, when they work, precisely because
of these framing cognitive models and practices. They are not,
as Searle mistakenly thinks, merely non-propositional, nonsemantic background assumptions. Rather, they are part of our
conceptual apparatus by which we make sense of and act
purposively within concrete situations.
One of the central accomplishments of A Clearing in the
Forest16 is that it mounts a massive empirical challenge to the
traditional objectivist, fundamentalist theory of law as rule
application. Winter sums this up as follows:
Thus, rules do work; it is just that they do not work in the rule-like
Tacit knowledge of a
way supposed by the conventional view ....
rule's motivating context is both what makes a rule readable and
what governs its reach. Because motivation acts as a frame for the
rule's component
categories, it also characterizes prototypes under
7
the le.'

The key notion here is motivation, where "motivation is a
function of the existing background of sedimented cultural
practice and social experience: the customs, conventions, roles,
routines, institutions, objects and other artifacts that comprise
the repertoire of which a society is constituted." 8 Winter
concludes:

6
7 WINTER, supra note 4.

Id. at 191.
's Id. at 191-92.
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In other words, the ability to create cultural meanings that will be
understood as law is contingent on the available social practices,
expectations, and mores. Law, then, is the unmistakable product of
human interactions as they are institutionalized first in social
practice and then as cultural and legal norms.19

Winter then proceeds to apply this view of situated,
embodied, imaginative meaning and reasoning to the analysis
of aspects of various well-known legal cases. In his treatment
of the Hart-Fuller debate over the interpretation of a rule
prohibiting the use of wheeled vehicles in a public park, he
shows that, however "indeterminate" the concept vehicle may
appear to be in particular cases, our shared cultural,
historically-evolving conceptions of the nature, purpose, and
meaning of parks allow us to apply this rule with all the
specificity we could ever need." Winter's analyses show that
the total inadequacy of the conventional objectivist view of
laws as rationalist rules in no way undermines our ability to
apply laws, because laws are given meaning, purpose, and
force by virtue of the shared meanings, practices, and values
that make up our evolving cultural experience.
Notice, however, that acknowledging the role of human
practices in the understanding and application of law in no
way leads to subjectivism and relativism. The reason for this is
that human understanding and practices are constrained by
our embodied interactions with our environment. Using the
results about human thought that are coming out of the
cognitive sciences, Winter is thus able to explain both the
relative determinacy and the relative indeterminacy of law.
Law appears to be completely determinate, and to fit the
conventional objectivist or rationalist view ofrules, whenever
the case in question straightforwardly matches some prototype
within the key concepts. Those are the easy cases-the cases at
the "core" of the concept-that give us the feeling of certainty,
clarity, and ease about what the law means. People out for a
Sunday drive are not allowed to take their car for a cruise
along the park pathways. Non-prototypical cases can be settled
insofar as they can be related to various noncentral members of
the category. This requires understanding the principles of
19
20

Id. at 193.
Id. at 202-06.

20021

LAW INCARNATE

extension from the central members, and it requires extensive
knowledge of background cognitive models. Because members
of a culture will have some shared views about the purposes of
parks, at least partial agreement about interpretation of laws
pertaining to parks will be possible. Yet there will always be a
relative indeterminacy and openness for any rules and laws we
construct. This is not a problem to be lamented, as if it
undermines law; rather, it simply recognizes the indeterminacy
that makes it possible for law to be continuously renewed,
relative to changing conditions, values, purposes, interests, and
expectations of societies.
As an example of this embodied, situated nature of
concepts and rules, consider the spirited and acrimonious
public debate over the rules for counting votes that arose in the
U.S. presidential election of 2000. One poll conducted shortly
after the legal battle over whether a recount should be
undertaken indicated that a majority of the American voters
were of the opinion that the events surrounding the election
show that "the system is broken and needs to be fixed." But
was anything "broken?" Perhaps not.
What I found particularly interesting about this
argument was the ways it illustrated our cultural reflections
on key concepts, leading to their evolution, for better or worse.
Maybe what this entire debate showed is just how it is that law
grows and evolves according to ordinary cognitive mechanisms.
For example, the election debate revealed the complex
prototype effects associated with our category counting. With
an objectivist view of concepts and rules, counting should be a
category defined by necessary and sufficient conditions. The
rules should specify what makes for, to use the Democratic
slogan, "a full, fair, and accurate count." But what counts as
counting? The interpretation of this concept was precisely the
issue. One of the things that became quite clear is how much
our purposes, interests, and values play a key role in the
certification of votes. The concept of a "fair and accurate count"
is defined relative to our values, which are themselves the
subject of ongoing dispute. When the vote is not close, such
issues never arise. But what happens when the election is on
the line?
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Consider, for example, why many Republicans were
infuriated that we would have, as they said repeatedly, "a
count, a recount, and another recount," while Democrats could
find this perfectly sane and reasonable. One of the things at
stake here, among many things, was our cognitive model of
counting. If, using an objectivist view of concepts and reason,
you conceive of counting as an algorithmic procedure carried
out on discrete concrete or abstract objects, according to rules
operating over classical literal concepts, then one count should
be enough. The last thing such a person would want is socalled human "subjectivity" brought into the counting process.
But if you think of this as a matter of discerning a voter's
intention, then you will think it not only appropriate, but
necessary, to make individual judgments concerning whether a
dimpled, pregnant, or hanging chad on a ballot indicates a
voter's intention.
Although I was distressed by all the ugliness, nastiness,
and hostility that this election spawned, I think that this
debate and the associated proceedings are an important part of
what goes into the transformation of our electoral process. This
is precisely how we go about reconsidering our understanding
of our fundamental concepts about elections. In spite of all the
nastiness and animosity that -arose around these issues, this
situated process of reflection is a fine example of healthy
conceptual expansion and revision of the sort that Winter
examines so perceptively and profoundly in law.
In subsequent chapters, Winter goes on to explore this
more creative, constructive, adaptive character of law. Once
again, using what we are learning about various imaginative
structures such as conceptual metaphor, prototypes, blending,
analogy, and narrative, he gives an account of the possible
growth of law as a dynamic process. Chapter nine explains the
cognitive capacities and principles that give analogical
reasoning the important role it has in law. In what is to me one
of the most compelling chapters in the book, he then proceeds
to explain how innovation is possible by means of the cognitive
devices he has explored earlier.2 ' On this cognitively oriented
view, innovation is not, as Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson

21 WINTER, supra note 4, at ch. 9.

LAW INCARNATE

2002]

mistakenly believe,2 merely an irrational, unmotivated, radical
leap in thought that somehow reshuffles our entire
conceptualization of a phenomenon. Instead, as Mark Turner
has argued in several of his books,u originality is possible
because of ordinary cognitive mechanisms and imaginative
structures, such as images, image schemas, conceptual
metaphors and metonymies, prototypes, and radial categories.
One of the things Winter does so beautifully is to show how
now-famous legal arguments were able to transform our
understanding of key legal concepts in ways that now make
perfect sense, once we understand the background conditions
and assumptions that can retrospectively be seen to be
relevant to the cases in question.'
In certain ways, the chapter on innovation is the
culmination of Winter's argument for the whole book, which he
summarizes as follows:
[(1)] that, despite the fact that it is conventional to think of
imagination as random, unpredictable, or indeterminate, it is
actually orderly and systematic in operation; and (2) that, because
legal concepts (like all concepts) depend for their coherence on the
motivating contexts that ground meaning, legal change (no less than
stability) is contingent on the larger social practices and forms of life

that give the law its shape and meaning.
Consequently, legal fundamentalism is both wrong and
dangerous. It is wrong because it depends on a seriously
mistaken view of how the mind works. It cannot explain what
actually goes on in legal reasoning, because it is based on false
literalist and objectivist theories of thought and language. It is
dangerousbecause it tries to force law into dichotomous modes
of thought and absolutist models that ignore the embodied
social and cultural bases of human understanding and value.
This is a serious error committed both by foundationalists and
Donald Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, 5 CRITICAL INQUIRY 31 (1978);
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY,

Richard Rorty, The Contingency of Language, in
IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 3-22 (1989).

Turner's most thorough treatment of innovation and originality is found in

his book,

MARK TURNER, READING MINDS: THE STuDY

COGNITIVE
24 SCIENCE chs. 3,7-9 (1979).
WINTER, supra note 4, at chs. 9-11.
25Id.

at 259-60.
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by post-modern relativists. By humanizing law-that is, by
showing its human cognitive roots-Winter makes law more
humane and responsive to the complexities of human
existence.
So, law is a many-splendored, ongoing human
accomplishment. To understand law and legal reasoning, we
have to understand who we are, how we develop our cognitive
capacities, how our minds work, and how what we can think
depends crucially on our shared embodiment and our shared
social and cultural practices, values, and institutions. There is,
I repeat, nothing subjectivist about this view. It is not law in
the service of arbitrary power. Rather, it sees law as situated
and constrained by traditions of debate, protest, resistance,
suffering, and cooperation. In understanding everything that
goes into this process of law-making, cognitive science becomes
not merely relevant, but indispensable. Steve Winter lays out
for us, in a stunning manner, what the ground plan for such an
application of cognitive science for law would look like. And he
does it with sensitivity and humanity. His book sets the
standard for what will become known as "the cognitive science
of law."

